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Introduction
In addressing the South African Science and Religion Forum on the topic of deep incarnation and 
deep history, I do so with a profound awareness that we are situated here amongst the birth seeds 
of humanity.1 The fields and caves around us contain the ‘Cradle of Humankind’, within which 
around 40% of all hominid fossils have been excavated (most recently Homo naledi). In this place, 
we are in contact with deep history. Yet we also find in South Africa a ‘microcosm of the world’ 
(Augustine Shutte), a melting pot for many striving influences and ways of life. In this country, 
words like ‘conflict’ and ‘reconciliation’ have gained a special meaning. Coming from the more 
homogenous country of Denmark, just as much as I am here to present to you, I am also here, 
therefore, as a learner too. Indeed, in the past I have learned much from South African social 
thinkers, and from the significant pool of scholars within the field of science and religion that 
South Africa has produced – some coming from physics, others from philosophy and theology 
(cf. Conradie & Du Toit 2015:455–479).2
Why deep incarnation
My task today is to develop further the concept of deep incarnation whose first contours I laid out 
in a 2001 article, ‘The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World’. In that paper, I argued that a 
radical or ‘deep’ view of incarnation implies ‘an incarnation into the very tissue of biological 
existence, and system of nature’. The focus was here on the cross of Christ as a divine self-
identification with the frailty and pain of biological creatures: ‘God assumed not only the body of 
a particular human person: Jesus from Nazareth. God also assumed a humanity and a vital and 
fragile body susceptible to decay and death’. My task today is to develop further the concept of 
deep incarnation that I laid out in its first contours in a 2001 article, ‘The Cross of Christ in an 
Evolutionary World’. I here argued that a radical or deep view of incarnation implies ‘an 
incarnation into the very tissue of biological existence, and system of nature’. The focus was here 
on the cross of Christ as a divine self-identification with the frailty and pain of biological creatures:
God assumed not only the body of a particular human person: Jesus from Nazareth. God also assumed a 
human being and a vital and fragile body susceptible to decay and death. (Gregersen 2001:204–205)
In this context, I coined the term ‘deep incarnation’ almost in passing, as part of a theological 
response to the problem of evolutionary suffering. In the light of evolution, suffering amongst 
1.Paper given for South African Science and Religion Forum (SASRF) Conference on ‘Creation, Consciousness and Christology: Evolutionary 
Perspectives’, University of Pretoria, September 16, 2015. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Harris Wiseman for language 
improvements.
2.Allow me to note with gratitude that I have much benefitted from the hospitality of South African colleagues and friends, both in 
Princeton through Wentzel and Hester van Huyssteen during the 1990’s, and later in 1999 via the 1999 SASFR conference in Pretoria 
(Cornel du Toit and Daniel Veldsman), Durban (Peter Barrett and friends), and Cape Town (George Ellis) (cf. Du Toit 2000). 
This article presents in broad outline the theological concept of deep incarnation and brings it 
into dialogue with correlative ideas of deep history and deep sociality. It will be argued that 
neither Christology, nor evolution, can be properly understood from a chronocentric 
perspective. Evolution is not only about development but also about the exploration of 
ecospace. Likewise, a contemporary Christology should explicate incarnation as a divine 
assumption of the full ecospace of the material world of creation. It will then be argued that an 
interactionist view of deep history is preferable to the evolutionary cognitive theory of religion 
(ECTR). Against this background, the paper will explore Jesus of Nazareth’s role in the context 
of post-axial mentalities.
Deep incarnation: From deep history to  
post-axial religion
Note: Original Research: Volume 17 in the South African Science and Religion Forum Series, edited by Prof. Cornel du Toit (UNISA) and 
Prof. Daniel Veldsman, entitled ‘Creation, Consciousness and Christology: Evolutionary Perspectives’, Proceedings of the 20th conference 
of the South African Science and Religion Forum (SASRF) of the Research Institute for Theology and Religion held at the University of 
South Africa, Pretoria 16–18 September 2015.
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sentient beings is not only an accidental by-product of 
evolution, but is part and parcel of the evolution itself, 
driven as it is by natural selection. Creation and evolution 
makes up a package deal, as it were, in which woes and joys 
are inextricably conjoined. Hence, we would not have the 
protective atmosphere of our Earth without volcanos; we 
would not have seen the proliferation of life without the 
cracks of the tectonic plates responsible for earthquakes and 
tsunamis; we would not have the alertness and sudden 
movements of animals without the interplay between pray 
and predators. All this goes, for good and bad, also for 
human life. As pointedly expressed by the UNISA professor, 
Ramathate Dolamo, in an early discussion of deep 
incarnation: ‘Whenever we celebrate something, we 
slaughter something’ (R. Dolamo [LWF global conference on 
theology in the life of the Lutheran churches] pers. comm., 
2009).
So, how could the idea that ‘God became human’ in a man 
called Jesus, living in a remote area of Palestine 2000 years 
ago, possibly come to offer any relevant perspective to 
problems of suffering and decay during these first 4 billion 
years of biological life, leading to sentient beings perhaps 
600 million years ago, and to the formation of animal group 
life and human civilisation some million years ago? Isn’t 
there something unconvincing, anachronistic even, about 
bringing Jesus into the much larger canvass of evolution?
Perhaps so, as long as one assumes a modern individualised 
concept of what it means to be a human. If we think of the 
incarnation in purely historical terms (Jesus as a bygone 
historical figure), and at the same time subscribe to the 
metaphysics of historicism (all that exists only exists as 
indexed in time and space), we could only speak of a skin-
deep incarnation. Our concepts of incarnation would then be 
framed within a dermal metaphysics, presupposing that 
human beings are what they are only within the skin of their 
bodies, just like their moods and thoughts exist entirely 
within their skulls.
In contrast, deep incarnation presupposes a wide-scope 
view of incarnation by focusing on the extended mind of 
Jesus, constituted by the landscapes in which he is placed, 
the birds in the sky, the lilies in the field, and many human 
groups and fractions that he – like us today – meet along our 
ways (Gregersen 2012:235–245). The very notion of 
incarnation is to be expressed as part of an extensive 
interactionist view of the embodied mind. But the concept of 
incarnation also operates within the horizon of a cosmic 
Christology. In the Pauline and Johannine traditions 
Christology is part of both a creation theology, and a cosmic 
Wisdom Christology too.
Admittedly it took me some years to become aware of the 
wider implications of the concept of deep incarnation. I came 
to realise that the idea of deep incarnation contains a critique 
of prevailing Western theological traditions, both regarding 
their anthropocentrism and chronocentrism.
In the Middle Ages, Anselm of Canterbury posed the 
question, Cur deus homo – Why did God become human? But 
nowhere in the New Testament does one find the view 
expressed that God simply became man. Firstly, it is neither 
God the Father nor the Spirit but only the Son of God that is 
coming into the world of flesh – not only in flesh, but as flesh 
(Gregersen 2013a:251–262). Secondly, it is the concept of flesh 
(in Greek, sarx), and not that of humanity that is highlighted 
in the Prologue of John: ‘And the Word became flesh and 
lived among us’ (Jn 1:14). Similarly Paul said that God ‘sent 
his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh’ (Rm 8:3). Also in 
the Philippian hymn of the self-emptying of Christ, the 
humanity of Christ is not depicted as the apex of creation but 
as the most pitiful creature: Christ Jesus:
emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human 
likeness; and being found in human form, he humbled himself, 
and became obedient to the point of death – even death on a 
cross. (Phil 2:7–8)
The Johannine expression that the divine Logos becomes 
flesh connotes an understanding of the divine embodied in a 
frail materiality, and in a world of sins (in the case of humans). 
The Greek term sarx thus means, (1) the concrete body of 
Jesus, (2) the human world of sin and (3) the whole wool and 
wharf of materiality – everything material, from cosmic dust 
to mud, to the life-forms of grass and weed onwards to 
animal and human existence. Accordingly the theological 
concept of incarnation has to be extended into the whole 
fabric of physical and biological creation.
Moreover, in Jesus God assumes not only the sunny side of 
reality but also the darker, chaotic aspects of reality:
Deep incarnation is the view that God’s own Logos (Wisdom 
and Word) was made flesh in Jesus the Christ in such a 
comprehensive manner that God, by assuming the particular life 
story of Jesus the Jew from Nazareth, also conjoined the material 
conditions of creaturely existence (‘all flesh’), shared and 
ennobled the fate of all biological life forms (‘grass’ and ‘lilies’), 
and experienced the pains of sensitive creatures (‘sparrows’ and 
‘foxes’) from within. Deep incarnation thus presupposes a 
radical embodiment that reaches into in the roots (radices) of 
material and biological existence as well as into the darker sides 
of creation: the tenebrae creationis. (Gregersen 2015a:225–226)
In this view, God does not only tolerate material existence, 
but God becomes involved with the world, appears within it, 
shares creaturely experiences from within, and – if we follow 
the particular trajectory of the Jesus story – takes side with 
the victims of evolution and social injustice. Jesus the 
Immanuel (‘the God with us’) died the death of an animal, 
and he died as a social outcast, his death being the result of a 
miscarriage of justice by religious authorities as well as 
political powers, and in the end scorned even by ordinary 
people. If God’s own being was present in the life story of 
Jesus, as Christians believe, then Christ is present from the 
bottom of the universe and up, emerging from within the 
realm of creation no less than descending from above. The 
proposal of deep incarnation is thus both ‘high’ in Christology 
and ‘low’ in materiality.
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Moving beyond anthropocentrism 
while accepting anthropogenic 
conditions
From the perspective of deep incarnation, the general gist of 
Western theology appears to be overly anthropocentric, 
focusing particularly on human individuality. It is 
understandable that the Christian tradition has given priority 
to humanity when speaking of salvation. The creatures in 
need of salvation are, obviously, creatures such as ourselves, 
while conversions are hardly needed for grass, sparrows and 
dolphins. That being so, as emphasised by Joseph Sittler, Ein 
Mensch ist kein Mensch: solitary individuals are not real 
human beings (Smith 2015:69). A similar view is encapsulated 
in the principle of the South African philosophy of Ubuntu 
which speaks of a universal bond of sharing that connects all 
humanity. A person is a person through other persons: 
Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (Forster 2007:245–289).
The crucial question, then, must be whether our sense of 
interdependence should be directed only towards those 
within our own group, those with whom we have ties of 
obligations (the family, the clan, the peer group, the patron), 
and so on – a narrow form of communitarianism? Or, does 
this interhuman codependence reach beyond our own 
communities – to those who do not look like us, do not think 
like us, and do not believe as we believe? Is there, in the midst 
of our many differences, often profound differences, also 
something like a basic shared humanity? It is beyond doubt 
that the Jesus tradition underlying and sustaining the concept 
of deep incarnation speaks consistently about a shared sense 
of humaneness, transcending the divide between friends and 
foes, as exemplified in Jesus’ parable of the good Samaritan 
(Lk 10:25–37).
Yet concepts of personhood, whatever their provenance, also 
need to respond to another question. Do our concepts of an 
interhuman community also include non-human agents such 
as animals and the landscapes into which human lives are 
woven, and upon which we are most certainly dependent. 
Certainly, more recent attempts to reformulate a philosophy 
of Ubuntu emphasise this sort of question. As A.O. Balcomb 
put it, ‘The interconnectedness of the universe, beginning 
with the creator and going all the way down to rocks, can 
surely not be more strongly stated [than in the Ubuntu 
philosophy]. Here is a system that is indeed a Cartesian 
nightmare and a Whiteheadian dream’ (Balcomb 2004:71). If 
this is so, the theological proposal of deep incarnation would 
find a most congenial and vivid correlate in the mindset of 
Ubuntu philosophy.
But there is more, for we need to pose a third follow-up 
question: what do all these considerations mean for human 
persons endowed with a consciousness. Such consciousness is 
always individualised in the very basic sense that each of us 
have to respond precisely as persons to the environmental and 
communal contexts of which we are part. I shall return to this 
question towards the end of the paper when discussing the 
questions of post-axial religion. For the moment it will 
suffice to outline a distinction between anthropocentric and 
anthropogenic frames of reference. The suggestion will be 
made that an anthropocentric understanding of humanity and 
the world is problematic. Nonetheless, we have to take seriously 
the fact that human feelings, perceptions, and concepts will 
always be our inevitable point of departure. What this entails, 
however, is that all human thinking is unavoidably anthropogenic, 
that is, always starting out from a human point of view. The 
inevitability of human point of departure does not necessitate 
an anthropocentric view, which presupposes that the meaning of 
life is only about its value for human beings. Much joy and 
suffering alike take place in this universe fully beyond its 
human recognition. Indeed, such goings on outstrip our 
capacity to even imagine them. The concept of the Logos, or 
Wisdom of God, here serves as a constraining concept, pointing 
to the limitations of human wisdom.
Moving beyond chronocentrism: 
The relevance of place and ecospace
I would like to point to another problem that the concept of 
deep incarnation raises for our dominant Western theological 
paradigms. Here, I am thinking of the overprivileging of time 
over space. As the British crime writer and lay theologian 
Dorothy Sayers put it, the Christian dogma of incarnation is 
unique in its claim that God has not only created the 
framework of the world, but also has a ‘date’ within it, in the 
twofold sense of both representing a location in time, but also 
in the sense of an appointment set with somebody 
(cf. Gregersen 2010:167–182; Sayers 1969:14).3
Indeed, that God has a ‘date’ with human beings is the 
particular point of Christian faith. It is therefore 
understandable that there has been a certain privileging of 
time within the Christian tradition. Some have given priority 
to history in terms of God’s oikonomia of salvation (in both 
Eastern and Western theology); some have pointed to crucial 
temporal events or moments (as in Paul Tillich’s kairos 
theology, and in the South African Kairos-Document); some in 
terms of the universal history of humanity (Universalgeschichte), 
as in the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg.
The problem with such focus on time and human history, 
however, has been the corresponding neglect of space. By 
forgetting place and body, Christian self-reflection 
unnecessarily loses some significant scope and becomes 
chronocentric in its theologising. Even though Christians 
routinely speak of incarnation (incarnation literally means 
‘going into flesh’), many theologians have been preoccupied 
with the idea of ‘God coming to mind’ (to use a phrase of 
Levinas). But paradoxically, by elevating ourselves above 
space and place we are dwarfing ourselves. By claiming to 
possess humanity as an autonomous domain, there is a sense 
in which we become less than human, because our humanity 
is inextricably tied up in that web of creation and needs to be 
understood in light of that web.
3.In this section, I adapt arguments from my essay, ‘Deep incarnation: Logos became 
flesh’ (Gregersen 2010).
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Likewise, we are dwarfing the potentials of Christology for 
broaching wider questions of philosophy, science and religion, 
if we think that Christology can be explicated solely within a 
historicist framework, such that that the ultimate task of 
theology regarding the person of Jesus involves only 
reconstructing him as a remarkable individual of a bygone 
past. But speaking of Jesus as Christ means that God was in 
Jesus the Christ – in such a penetrating way that this transverses 
all of space and time. Put differently, the words and deeds of 
Jesus as Christ manifest who God was, is and will be forever – 
and this includes the full scope of the billions of years before 
and after the Jesus story. As within the sciences, we here have 
to reflect on repetitive features and perennial issues that are 
always exemplified (‘instantiated’) in time and space, but 
which extend beyond any given single time or space unit. This 
goes for God the creator, God the eternal Son, and the Holy 
Spirit, just as it does for quantum fields and laws of gravity.
As such, I am bringing to the table a rather specific theological 
proposal for science and religion discussion. The view of 
deep incarnation speaks of a universe in which God is not 
only present in a general manner (as expressed in traditional 
concepts of the immanent activity of the divine creator), but 
in which God is conjoining and uniting with the material 
world in the bodily form of God’s incarnate Son of Logos or 
Wisdom. Hence God is feeling and experiencing material 
existence from the inside out, while sharing the joys and 
sufferings of God’s own creatures. Accordingly, what from 
our temporalised perspective is an event that took place in 
the 30 years of the life story of Jesus is from the perspective of 
eternity a process beginning with creation itself, which 
culminated in the incarnation of Jesus, and is still with us 
because of the depths of the resurrection of Christ.
The Roman-Catholic feminist Elizabeth Johnson (2015: 
133–156) has helpfully coined the term ‘deep resurrection’ as 
a correlate to deep incarnation. For, not only does the 
particular incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth go the whole way 
down, from the particulars of his human personhood into the 
depths of biological and physical materiality, but the biblical 
concept of incarnation also states that the fullness of divine 
identity was present in him – he was fully divine in the midst 
of material existence.4 Accordingly, the historical incarnation 
goes deep into the heart of divine life, at once expressing the 
depths of God’s fatherly love for the world,5 while also 
bringing into divine life the inside experience of the world of 
creation, so that in the end creatures will live and become 
united in the eternal life of God.6
In sum, there is no way of speaking about time without also 
speaking about space and place. Moreover, there is no way of 
speaking about time without also speaking of eternity in the 
sense of the copresence of all times (past and present).
4.Cf. Col 2:9: ‘For in him the whole fullness (pleroma) of deity dwells bodily’.
5.Cf. John 3:16: ‘For God so loved the world that he gave his only son’.
6.John 17:22–23: ‘so that they may be one, as we are one. I in them and you in me, 
that they may become completely one, so that the world may know that you have 
sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me’.
A methodological interlude
Here I will pose a few methodological reflections on the 
relations between theology and the natural sciences. The 
view of deep incarnation, as laid out above, cannot be 
translated into the worldview of empirical science, obviously. 
But this does not mean that there is no connection between 
the proposal of deep incarnation and scientific descriptions 
of reality. Here, I am in agreement with Wentzel van 
Huyssteen‘s view that there are many legitimate resources 
and forms of rationality over and above that specific form we 
find exemplified in the empirical sciences. As such, theology 
should not take it as necessary that it be subsumed under that 
specific scientific form of rationality, nor that it need find its 
place within existing sciences, be that quantum theory, 
evolutionary theory or information theory, and so on. Rather, 
theology should seek interdisciplinarity by bringing its own 
theories to the wider market of ideas and candidates for 
truth. As van Huyssteen put it: ‘we should as theologians be 
able to enter the pluralist, multidisciplinary conversation 
with our full personal convictions intact and at the same time 
be empowered to step beyond the limitations of our contexts 
and traditions in critical self-reflection’ (Gregersen 2015b: 
141–159; Van Huyssteen 2011:78–79).
In my own work, I have perhaps focused less on such 
personal convictions than on the community-based traditions 
that have cultivated modes of thought hospitable to religious 
experiences. What are religious assumptions about? How are 
they backed up by underlying religious commitments? How 
can they be explicated in ways that are intelligible to partners 
outside of one’s own discipline, and to people with only little 
religious sentiment? Working as a theologian in a secular 
context, I have argued that it is one of theology’s tasks to 
redescribe, as far as possible, theological concerns in a 
language resonant with other forms of human inquiry. Here, 
the precept and exhortation is, as stated by Daniel Veldsman 
(2004:290): ‘Connect!’7 However, the danger for the 
programme of the sort of contextual coherence theory that I 
have advocated (cf. Gregersen 1998:181–231) is that the 
theologian only tends to pick up views that are already 
friendly to his or her own perspective, while neglecting other 
relevant discussion partners. The danger is what Mikael 
Stenmark at Uppsala University has called a ‘customised 
science’, that is, a science tailored to conform to one’s own 
prior commitments.8 My aim is to avoid this pitfall by giving 
due weight to well established aspects of science, and to 
discuss alternative scientific proposals that might be relevant 
to the idea of deep incarnation.
But there is also a danger going in the other direction: sliding 
from science into theology by theologising scientific concepts. 
7.In this article Veldsman (2004:292–295) is also raising the critical question whether 
the role of religious experience is not underestimated in standard science-and-
religion discussions. This is in my view a valid concern. Certainly, cognitive aspects 
of religion are always undergirded by long-standing emotions and moods. While the 
interactionist view of religion in ecospace might be a step in the right direction, it is 
hardly sufficient in itself.
8.See http://www.crs.uu.se/Research/impactofreligion/Theme_6/customized science, 
viewed 15 March 2016.
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For example, in public and academic contexts, scholars in 
science and religion are regularly asked the question: ‘What 
are the “implications” of evolutionary theory for theology?9 
But there is, in my view, reason for caution when speaking 
too straightforwardly about ‘implications’ of scientific 
theories for philosophy and theology. The question itself, 
even if asked in a friendly manner, suggests a one-way street 
leading from science to religion. But there exist no strict 
entailment relations between, say, evolutionary theory and 
concepts of divinity.
Firstly, unlike the physical sciences, the biological sciences 
are not fundamental sciences aiming at digging down into 
ultimate reality. Rather, the biological sciences belong to the 
category of the domain-specific sciences, concerned with 
explaining resilient structures and formative developments 
of living organisms, once life has emerged on planet Earth 
(and on other sites for life, if they exist). But because concepts 
of God are intrinsically related to the question of ultimate 
reality, the biological sciences cannot logically be their 
ultimate arbiter, even though evolutionary theory, as we shall 
see, is without question connected to religious self-reflection 
in many significant ways.
Secondly, concepts of God build on a vast repertoire of 
religious experiences, linguistic traditions and theological 
reflections, which seem to escape objective empirical modes 
of grasping at phenomena. Religious approaches to reality – 
doubt and certainty, fear and trembling, longing and desire, 
and intimations of horizons of what is ultimately real – are 
not easily transported into data amenable for a subsequent 
empirical classification. In standard working patterns of the 
natural sciences, questions of personal meaning, value and 
significance, so pertinent for religious practitioners, are all 
excluded from scientific inquiry. After all, usually the sciences 
exercise a methodological puritanism with respect to the 
manifold world of phenomena (there are exceptions, fields 
such as ecology and the medical sciences). As we will see 
below, this does not mean that all aspects of religious 
experience necessarily fall beyond the scope of evolutionary 
explanation. To this end, discussion now moves to two 
contrasting paradigms: Evolutionary Cognitive Theory of 
Evolution and Deep History.
Evolutionary cognitive theory of 
religion: Strengths and weaknesses
The research literature on evolutionary cognitive theory of 
religion (ECTR) has been growing over the last 20 years, and 
we are now witnessing philosophically informed discussions 
on the results and limitations of the different proposals 
within this movement (Gregersen 2003; Visala 2011; cf. 
Watts & Turner 2014). These ECTR studies exemplify, most 
likely, the first sustained attempt at a genuinely scientific 
theory of (some) religious representations and (some) ritual 
9.For example, I was asked by Richard Bright (editor of the Interalia Magazine) about 
the religious ‘implications’ of the new scientific perspectives on complex systems, 
emergence, and information (cf. Richard Bright & Niels Henrik Gregersen, 2014, 
‘Complexity and theological perspectives’, Interalia Magazine 1(4), 1–8, viewed 
4 August 2014, from http://www.interaliamag.org/author/nielshenrikgregersen.
practices. Even if there is no particular view of God entailed 
by evolutionary theory as such, it is suggested that biological 
frameworks may still be able to explain particular aspects of 
the cultural persistence of religious mentalities and practices.
ECTR is potentially of significance for understanding the 
formation of concepts of gods and other so-called 
‘supernatural agents’ over time and across cultures. The 
Darwinian framework of these studies is clear, insofar as 
ECTR builds on the assumptions of evolutionary psychology. 
Although it has not been possible to identify genes for 
religion, evolutionary psychology and ECTR propose an 
intermediary step between genes and culture: genes are 
responsible for the hardwired modular structure of the brain, 
which then gives rise to, and puts constraints on, the 
repertoires of religious representations and ritual behaviours. 
The brain’s modularity is thus hypothesised to be basically 
self-identical over 100 000 years, or more. Fear of God and 
other supernatural agents, or human longing for partnering 
with such ‘supernatural agents’, are thus hypothesised to be 
derived from our built-in module for an ‘agency detection 
device’ (ADD). Although agency detection has been helpful 
in singling out potential predators (and helpers) in human 
prehistory, it has – so ECTR – been overdeveloped religiously 
into a more free-floating imagination of supernatural agents. 
Religious representation comes about in spontaneous moves 
from ADD to HADD (‘hyperactive agency detection device’). 
So the basic theory goes.
In that way, ECTR claims to have explained why aspects of 
traditional theism (including invisible personal beings of 
several sorts, from ancestors to ghosts) are widespread across 
cultures, just as we have notions of divine ubiquity and 
everlastingness in just about any human culture. Folk religion 
involves an ‘intuitive theism’ or an ‘intuitive spiritism’, often 
in combination. We are naturally biased, so to speak, in 
favour of religious representations, because contingent 
experiences of certain sorts tend to trigger concepts of gods 
or spirits, produced by the HADD.
In particular, ECTR has been able to illuminate the tension 
between folk religion and the official theology of particular 
religious traditions. Buddhism, for example, officially claims 
that there exist no personalised souls and no personal gods; 
but in folk Buddhism ghosts and helper avatars are infinitely 
many. Likewise Christianity, most of whose denominations 
officially hold a Trinitarian faith, is often in folk Christianity 
transformed into a more generalised monotheism, often 
mediated by guardian angels, or saints (Barrett 2012:3–23).
ECTR takes statistical analysis as its evidence base. However, 
given the statistical nature of evolutionary explanations, 
ECTR does not have much to say about the particular 
trajectories of religious traditions as regards to religious 
languages and interpretations, rituals and habits. The same 
goes for reflexive forms of religion, such as that which 
philosophers and theologians over the ages have proposed 
about religion, or about God. After all, natural selection is 
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unconcerned about truth and truth claims. Accordingly, a 
selection theory applied to culture may help explain to us 
what works fluently and is transmitted with ease, but it will 
have nothing to say about questions of truth, or coherence of 
ideas. Also, ECTR has nothing to say about the specific 
trajectories of religious tradition, for example, why the rather 
complex semantics of the Lord’s Prayer continue to be 
practiced within Christianity, alongside even more complex 
practices such as the Eucharist. In similar ways, scientific 
theories and practices are highly ‘unnatural’, because it is 
only through the difficult procedures of theory-making and 
contrived experiments that science has prevailed in modern 
human history. So, in parallel to the distinction in naturalness 
between folk and theological reflection, much the same might 
be posited about certain scientific ideas too. For example, 
Isaac Newton’s concept of matter as built up by corpuscular 
particles may be much more easily transmitted than 
something like quantum field theory, which is, needless to 
say, a highly complex affair, only accessible to a very small 
portion of the world’s inhabitants.
Having raised these caveats, one can say that philosophers 
and theologians might learn from ECTR that the more 
contrived are our formulations of philosophical and 
theological views, the more unlikely we will be successful in 
terms of public dissemination. In order to serve as a public 
philosophy and theology, more reflexive forms of religious 
reflection need some means of being translatable back into 
the more natural domains of knowledge that are more readily 
grasped by the broader cognitive structures of the human 
mind. Experiential recognition is important for any 
philosopher of religion who wants to be heard and 
understood.
Evolutionary cognitive science may thus help explain the 
cultural believability of at least some features of classical 
theism. Also the spatial metaphors activated in the idea of 
panentheism are relatively easy to communicate and 
transmit. The container-metaphor of something small ‘in’ 
something bigger belongs to the ‘metaphors we live by’ (to 
use the term of Lakoff and Johnson). Accordingly, we have 
persistent religious intuitions of a belonging to, and of being 
embraced by divinity.10 ECTR also shows how some concepts 
of God simply do not feature in religious thought. For 
example, no theism harbours the idea that God is only active 
some days, say Sundays, and not also on Thursdays, or that 
God is confined to some designated places only. By 
comparison, the presence of God is often thought to be 
revealed, or experientially present, ‘for us’ only at some 
particular places or situations, without being universally 
available for human cognition.
What should we think about the widespread assumption of 
an invisible, omnipresent and all-knowing God across 
religious traditions? Again, it should be noted that there is no 
one-way street from ECTR to the evaluation of the status of 
10.To my best knowledge (having asked colleagues working in the field), no ECTR 
program has as yet investigated the naturalness and statistical spread of 
panentheistic concepts of the divine.
concepts of God. One too-prevalent interpretation of ECTR is 
to take it as the ultimate explanation of religious cognition, 
hence as a reduction of religious representations to innate 
anthropomorphic projections – projections into the skies, as it 
were. Such a reductive projection hypothesis is widespread 
in the academic milieu of ECTR proponents (Bering 2011; 
Boyer 2002). There are several problems with this view.
Firstly, we have what has been termed the problem of 
collateral damage. Because all our natural concepts are 
hypothetically derived from the hardware of our Stone Age 
brains, the same projection hypothesis would apply to all 
other products of our brain – our primary sense qualities, our 
concepts of causality, all our attributions of personhood, etc. 
(Barrett 2007:61–62). In this respect, our ‘ordinary’ ADD and 
‘extraordinary’ propensities of HADD should be seen as 
placed on a continuum of more or less, rather than as 
belonging to two very different categories.11 Indeed, from this 
perspective, the bifurcation between ‘natural’ agents and 
‘supernatural’ agents is far more problematic than 
acknowledged by ECTR proponents.
Secondly, one might well argue that the only evidence for the 
spread of theistic representations is the empirical evidence of 
theistic representations themselves, as expressed in a variety 
of psychological experiments, or in historical material. 
Evolutionary explanations do not by themselves have 
something extra to offer, apart from the assumption of macro-
evolutionary lineages of representation, of which we have 
only a very scant empirical record. Empirically speaking, 
ECTR rests on a good handful of evidence within 
psychological ECTR-experiments – with or without the 
added evolutionary hypotheses.12
Thirdly, even if the evolutionary explanation of psychological 
states were somehow correct, we would still have the problem 
of how to explain the hypothesised macro-evolutionary 
trajectory of religious representations. Who takes the podium 
when it comes to offer the ultimate explanation of religious 
developments throughout evolution?13 Justin L. Barrett opens 
up for the following option:
Some Christians, including myself, offer [this] account: God 
created people with the capability to know and love him but 
with the free will. Consequently, our God-endowed nature leads 
us to believe, but human endeavors apart from God’s design 
may result in disbelief … God may have fine-tuned the cosmos 
to allow for life and for evolution and then orchestrated 
mutations and selection to produce the sort of organism we are – 
evolution through ‘supernatural selection’. (Barrett 2004:123)
11.I’m here reminded of C.S. Peirce’s concept of ‘synechism’, the assumption that 
everything in time and space is continuous (cf. Peirce 1998:1–3).
12.Interestingly, one of Justin Barrett’s latest books on cognitive science of religion, 
Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds 
(Barrett 2011) does not at all discuss ECTR. He also points out that scientific 
theories can be interpreted from different perspectives: ‘A scientific explanation of 
how human cognitive systems form beliefs in gods only “explains away” gods if you 
already believe they don’t exist. For believers, such explanation just specify the 
means by which actual gods are perceived and understood (or misunderstood)’ 
(Barret 2011:150).
13.I’m aware that evolutionary theory itself has a concept of ultimate explanation (in 
terms of evolutionary net-effects) as opposed to proximate causes, but I refer here 
to ultimate explanation in a philosophical sense. 
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Hermeneutically trained philosophers of religion will 
probably find this statement somewhat crude, and I admit to 
sharing some of the same concerns here. However, if one 
explores the language game of something explaining 
something else in a cause-effect way, then Barrett’s argument 
is not as simplistic as it might seem. For as earlier stated, 
evolutionary science, as ordinarily understood, works by 
bracketing ultimate explanations (in the philosophical sense 
of the term). Accordingly, if one is seeking some manner of 
ultimate explanation, then some higher-order explanation 
must also be sought for evolutionary processes too, because 
evolutionary theory, again, is not able to deliver ultimate 
explanations about reality. So too with our naturalist 
assumptions - for it is physics and chemistry that explain 
biology, and not the other way around.
What can be learned from ECTR, in my view, is the amount 
of sheer repetition in cultural evolution, the patterns. If we 
take the feature of evolutionary recurrence seriously in our 
interpretations of reality, we might learn to see ourselves not 
only as having friends (such as bacteria and gene-elements) 
far back in evolutionary time, but also as having friends, 
colleagues and sojourners, amongst believers within other 
traditions than our own as well. After all, the cognitive 
apparatus of the human mind is limited to rather few 
thoughts and forms of religious life. Therefore, it should not 
come as too great a surprise that philosophical debates within 
one tradition can often be found to be present, in some broad 
form, in other religious traditions too.
What is missing from the theory structure of ECTR, curiously 
enough, is an understanding of religion as taking place in the 
interface between human beings and their natural and social 
environments. Evolution is about the exploration of ecospace by 
organisms, individuals and groups. Only a very limited Neo-
Darwinian theory can be based on a gene-centred 
individualism and a corresponding chronocentric view of 
genetic lineages. But given the general nature of their 
assumptions, evolutionary psychology and ECTR are 
interested in the genetics of individuals or human groups. 
Likewise with ECTR, we do not find any interest in the 
functional complexities that emerge in the interface between 
human groups and their environments. The HAAD 
hypothesis is supposed to carry the full burden of explaining 
religious representations and belief, as if nothing else is 
needed from an explanatory perspective, and as if nothing 
has happened between the Stone Age and our age in terms of 
religious development.
To sum up, there is something highly ‘unbiological’ about the 
core assumptions of evolutionary psychology and ECTR. 
Biologically speaking, there is no evolution taking place 
outside of contingent ecological settings. Again, evolution is 
about the exploration of ecospace. Thus, evolution concerns 
both time and place: evolutionary developments within one 
group lead to new challenges and spatial configurations to be 
explored by other species. It is simply not possible to study 
the evolution of functionally complex systems without 
discussing features such as niche construction, that is, the 
formation of concrete structures that are adaptive for 
organisms (Mühling 2014).14
Deep history and the role of 
consciousness
Now I wish to discuss the recent proposal of deep history as a 
corollary to the concept of deep incarnation and the question 
of hominisation. ‘Deep history’ is a proposal coming out of a 
collaboration between Harvard prehistorians Daniel Lord 
Smail and Andrew Shyrock, both of whom question the 
standard separation between history and prehistory. Shyrock 
and Smail remind us that also scientists are in need of meta-
narratives, and today the dominant meta-narrative is phrased 
in evolutionary terms. Yet unlike proponents of the ECTR 
program, Smail does take the lesson of ‘interactionist 
approaches to genes and environment’ when suggesting that 
‘many social skills and social pathologies have both genetic 
and environmental components’ (cf. Gregersen 2013b: 
278–279; Smail 2008:136).
Using the general insight that emergent systems may 
generate punctuations and non-linear trends at any scale of 
analysis, Smail and Shyrock propose a variety of alternative 
governing metaphors and theoretical perspectives. These 
include kinshipping, family trees, co-evolutionary webs and 
spirals, extensions of social relations, fractal repetitions of 
patterns going from deep time into human civilisations and 
scalar integrations (Shyrock & Smail 2011:3–31).15 Not only 
do we share many of the same genes as our forebears, but 
quite a few of our basic cultural practices reveal a deep 
evolutionary presence in the midst of our civilisation. 
Numerous examples can be elaborated. One might think of 
the importance of energy exchanges with our environments: 
‘Ecological systems are the products of the organisms that 
inhabit them’ (Shyrock & Smail 2011:78). Or, one might think 
of the role of the body as a means of communication far 
below the threshold of intentional consciousness: ‘Bodies 
also extend over space’ (Shyrock & Smail 2011:58). One might 
think about patterns of our sharing of food that are similar to 
that of birds and other mammals, or of new ritualised forms 
by relating food to domination: ‘Food became a social 
differentiator’ (Shyrock & Smail 2011:151). Or reflect on the 
important role of ‘deep kinshipping’, for kinship is not only 
defined by genetic lines, but also by adoptions, household 
regulations and cultural affinities, including differentiations 
between male and female, incest taboos between brothers 
and sisters, rules for food sharing etc. In this way, kinshipping 
evolves as ‘a gradual thickening of social kinship’, but may 
even be widened to ‘include relations among species and 
environments’ (Shyrock & Smail 2011:187). Think, for 
14.Note that the centrality of niche-construction in evolution is uncontroversial within 
evolutionary biology. It is only debatable whether or not niche construction is an 
additional evolutionary mechanism in relation to standard neo-Darwinian theory, 
see the arguments pro and con in Scott-Phillips and Laland (2014:1231–1243). 
15.Shyrock and Smail (2011:19) state, ‘We propose a different array of governing 
metaphors. When skillfully deployed, analytical devices such as kinshipping, webs, 
trees, fractals, spirals, extensions, and scalar integration can help us better 
comprehend the immensity of human time and the dynamic of connectedness that 
both propels and constrains change’.
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example, of the domestication of dogs who became part of 
human households, or of the kinship relations established 
between groups and animals in totemism.
The deep historians, to the best of my knowledge, have not 
yet addressed the role of religion in ancient history. However, 
it only requires a little imagination to see the relevance of 
such deep time perspectives for a rereading of the gospels in 
light of such examples of ‘prehistoric’ traits in the Jesus story, 
to mention but one example. Here we also find a sense of the 
thickening of social relations centred around new definitions 
of kinship, proximity and strangeness: the ‘brothers and 
sisters’ of Jesus are those who do the will of God, our 
neighbour happens to be a Samaritan stranger, and his 
followers are even called to love their enemies. We have, on 
the one hand, culturally prevailing regulations and taboos 
concerning food sharing – yet, equally, we find Jesus 
transgressing the regulations about what food is allowed, 
when it is allowed, and with whom it is allowed, while also 
establishing new ways of communing.
From the perspective of deep history, evolution takes place in 
the continuous exchange between individual brain or minds 
and their social and natural environments. Even so, the 
importance of the social processes referred to above, are 
instantaneously understood by human beings, even by 
children in the schoolyard.
But it should also be noted that there is nothing deterministic 
about such biocultural processes, because they demand a 
constant reinterpretation and social negotiation. Semi-
automatic reactions and self-aware interpretation here walk 
together in the creation of ecocultural nexuses. Something 
similar may be the case in the development of religious ideas, 
which are always, in one sense, spontaneous and easy to go 
with, yet in another sense always moulded in specific 
linguistic and cultural contexts. In this view, human minds 
are not to be understood as operating within closed modular 
boxes, so to speak, which then become activated by external 
triggers, but rather achieve a flow of awareness, from 
something almost instinctual to something far more 
evaluative, interpretative and potentially self-reflective.
Here we find ourselves thrown back to the question of 
consciousness. After all, embodied minds are not only 
situated in time and place, as tiny examples of the universe. 
Embodied minds are also those for whom salient aspects of 
ecospace are perceived, evaluated and responded to. This is 
the irreducible first-hand experience of embodied minds. 
How does this fit into the proposal of deep incarnation?
This question was raised to me by van Huyssteen in an earlier 
reply to several responses to his work, including deep 
incarnation. He puts his endorsement and his challenge as 
follows:
I would certainly agree that ‘the incarnation of God’s Word in 
Jesus Christ assumed the full gamut of material and biological 
existence through the specific humanity of Jesus’. However, I 
would like to suggest strongly that the full gamut of material and 
biological existence is not just assumed through the very specific 
humanity of Jesus, but first of all also for the very specific 
humanity of Jesus. In other words, before Gregersen makes the 
important move to ‘deep ecology’ and from there to ‘deep 
incarnation’, I would still like to know more about who this man 
Jesus was: how do we understand the person or ‘self’ of Jesus, as 
embedded in evolutionary history as we also are? And what 
would it mean to understand Jesus’ embodied mind, his 
consciousness, the strengths and vulnerability of his male body, 
his own moral awareness and sexuality, his own symbolic 
propensities and religious imagination, and his self-awareness, 
as defining to the very core his own personhood? (Van Huyssteen 
2011:80–81)
Van Huyssteen rightly points out that a convincing concept 
of deep incarnation should not only be stated in theological 
terms (from above, as it were), but must also go the bottom-
up way from the experience of Jesus. This is what I aimed to 
do in the article ‘The Extensive Body of Jesus: The Social 
Body of Jesus According to Luke’ (Gregersen 2012), written 
as the correlate to the more doctrinal article ‘The Social Body 
of Christ: Three Dimensions of Deep Incarnation’ (Gregersen 
2015a). I agree that more work is needed. The problem is, 
however, that we cannot know what was going on in the 
mind of Jesus 2000 years ago. This is an established fact in 
historical Jesus-research, and we cannot hope to get around 
this fact. What we have to do (much like in body 
phenomenology) is to bracket the question of the individual 
consciousness of Jesus, and rather ask for the typical 
interactions of Jesus with his environments: the different 
landscapes (mountains, deserts, towns and cities) and the 
different groups that he is interacting with (people, elite 
groups, friends and foes).
Here I’m in basic agreement with van Huyssteen’s emphasis, 
‘The embodied mind as such, therefore, includes the world 
beyond the membrane of the organism, especially the 
interpersonal world of self and other, which is also the world 
in which mind and brain are essentially formed’ (Van 
Huyssteen 2011:82). I also find illuminative his reference to 
Thomas Fuchs’ view that the brain ‘acts as transformer, which 
translates the stimuli (single elements of a given situation) 
into wholes or Gestalt units, and finally into three cycles of 
embodiment: the affective self, the ecological self, and, 
ultimately, the intersubjective self’ (Van Huyssteen 2011:82). 
In my own work, I have for the same reasons been particularly 
interested in the theory of the ‘extended mind’ by Andy 
Clark.
Deep incarnation and post-axial 
religion
As we have seen, human minds are extensive minds, always 
in transactions with their environments, while being self-
reflective vis-à-vis the inherited cultures and religions. 
Likewise, the teachings and actions of Jesus must be 
understood as a highly self-reflexive form of religiosity. In the 
gospels he is sometimes depicted as speaking out in a humble 
attitude to the Jewish tradition (listening to the elders in the 
temple, Luke 4), sometimes in stark opposition to what was 
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taught in tradition, even in the codified scriptures of the 
Hebrew Bible. In this sense, Jesus had a post-axial attitude 
towards his tradition.
As is well known, the term Achsenzeit comes from the 
existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers. In Vom Ursprung und 
Ziel der Geschichte from 1949 he pointed to the deep cultural 
transformations taking place in the centuries around 500 BCE 
in Greece, Israel, China and India.16 According to Jaspers, 
these axial transformations offer shared resources for 
humanity in an age of a potential atomic disaster. Proponents 
of the axial age hypothesis nonetheless define the ‘axial’ in 
slightly different terms. Some have seen its core feature in the 
depths of selfhood facilitated by the urbanisation and large-
scale empires of the axial age (so Jaspers). Others have 
foregrounded the basic tension between the transcendental 
and mundane orders and the emergence of intellectual elites 
questioning the established social powers (as suggested by 
the Jewish scholar Shmuel N. Eisenstadt). Others point to 
transformation towards rationalisation and the accompanying 
move towards universalised forms of ethics (so suggested by 
Jürgen Habermas in the vein of Max Weber).
Before his death in 2013, the sociologist Robert N. Bellah 
published a major work under the title, Religion in Human 
Evolution (abbreviated as RHE), followed by the discussion 
volume, The Axial Age and Its Consequences (abbreviated as 
AAC) (Bellah 2011; Bellah & Joas 2012). The timeframe of 
Bellah’s book spans from early hominisation to the axial age, 
and vigorously applied throughout is the contention that 
‘evolution is historical; history is evolutionary’ (AAC 448). In 
describing his own view, Bellah writes that he is ‘basically 
neo-Darwinian’, aligning himself with the contention that 
variation and selection operate at the level of cultural traits 
and institutional structures (AAC 447). Bellah, however, 
argues for an organism-centred rather than a gene-centred 
view of evolution, and he points to the importance of niche 
constructions (think of beaver dams), which presuppose a 
goal-directedness of purposive organisms (RHE xii-xiii). 
Against this background, Bellah suggests that the reductive 
programs of evolutionary psychology (such as Pascal 
Boyer’s) are ‘particularly unhelpful’, not least because of 
their ‘lack of insight into religion as actually lived’ (RHE 629) 
(Bellah 2012:260–270).
However, the tough mechanism of selection operates on 
religious life-forms too. Moreover, the evolutionary 
perspective implies that the mentalities of our forefathers 
and foremothers are still with us today. ‘Nothing is ever lost’, 
as Bellah puts it pointedly (RHE 267). But like other niche-
constructing animals, human beings are socially sheltered 
from some of the more harsh pressures of natural selection. 
In other words, not everything unfit, construed in the most 
brute sense, is removed by natural selection. Human cultures 
offer ample room for what Alison Gopnik has termed the 
‘useful uselessness’ of play (RHE 89–90).
16.Some of the observations in this section are dealt with in more detail in Niels 
Henrik Gregersen, ‘Religion and Axiality: Theological Reflections on Robert N. 
Bellah’s Axial Age Hypothesis’, forthcoming in Scottish Journal of Theology.
Along with science and art, religious activity exemplifies the 
human capacity to ‘go offline’, as we do when we fall asleep 
and dream, or when we play and use our uniquely human 
capacity for symbolic imagination (RHE 9). This capacity for 
play has evolutionary precursors in other mammalians, and 
even among birds. Bellah here refers to Gordon Burghardt’s 
writings on the characteristics of animal play. Burghardt 
points to the following five features of play, (1) The limited 
survival value of play; (2) its inner pleasure, being enacted 
for its own sake; (3) its structural differentiation with 
temporal phases; (4) its modes of repetition; and finally (5) 
the ‘relaxed field’ of play sheltered from too strict pressures 
of selection (RHE 76–83).
Although play and ritual can be traced back in animal 
evolution, the capacity for symbolic transcendence may be a 
human prerogative, even though forms of expressive and 
indexical language exist also among higher animals. On this 
issue Bellah follows the argument of Terrence Deacon in the 
The Symbolic Species. Also, he is in line with Wentzel van 
Huyssteen who in his Gifford Lectures, Alone in the World?, 
suggested that ‘institutional animal behaviour such as 
territoriality, ritualisation, play, and the unmistakable 
capacity for feelings of meaning and loss (death) may be seen 
as precursors of the human sense of sacred place and time, of 
ritual and myth, ecstasy and mysticism’ (Van Huyssteen 
2006:204).
One of the strongest attempts to characterise axial civilisations 
in general terms can be found in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt who 
refers to the ‘combination of cultural orientations and 
institutional formations’ (AAC 266) based in the rupture of 
social orders in the axial age. Axial visions include a 
broadening of horizons that opens up for universal perspectives, 
an ontological distinction between mundane and transcendental 
orders, and the normative subordination of the mundane under 
a transcending perspective (AAC 267). This characterisation 
has the advantage of seeing the axial age as emerging from 
historical constellations that facilitated a new cluster of 
attitudes towards society and the wider reality.
This cluster view of the axial age opens up for the possibility 
of recognising differences between the four principal axial 
civilisations. The concept of Tien (heaven) in China, for 
example, is not separated from mundane reality in the 
manner of the Jewish God, the Platonic realm of ideas, or the 
Buddhist concept of Nirvana.
Here, Bellah follows Merlin Donald’s theory on the 
development from episodic cultures (also found among 
higher primates), to mimetic culture (in tribal societies), 
further on to mythic culture (in archaic society), towards the 
gradual formation of theoretical cultures, a development 
presupposing a new cognitive ability to store memory in 
external media outside the brain. In his earlier writings, 
Donald (2001) traced the beginnings of a theoretical culture 
back to about 40 000 years ago. He pursues a longue durée 
perspective regarding the consequences of the axial age: ‘The 
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Axial Age might be considered the first period that 
germinated the seeds of later full-blown Theoretic cultures, 
such as those currently governing the developed world. The 
evolutionary trend in the direction of institutionalised 
analytic thinking grew very slowly’ (AAC 70). For Donald as 
for Bellah, nothing is lost – the past of oral, ritualised and 
mythic cultures is present in the post-axial civilisations.
Thus, also the axial breakthroughs are ‘the children of the 
archaic cultures from which they rose’ (RHE 278). In this way, 
deep history is still with us. Religion, for example, is not only 
about ideas and representations but remains strongholds of 
religious commitment: ‘Ritual, when thrown out at the front 
door, returns at the back door: there are even antiritual rituals. 
Our embodiment and its rhythms are inescapable’ (RHE 278).
Judaism, Christianity and Islam exemplify the recurrent 
feature of a re-entry of rituality in scriptural religion. Studying 
the Torah (and the Talmud, etc.), studying the Qur’an (and the 
Hadith etc.) and studying the Bible (and the Church Fathers, 
etc.) becomes itself ritualised, when holy texts are canonised 
for use in the larger religious community.17 The dividing line 
only comes with respect to whether the scriptures are read 
and interpreted by scribes, priests or imams only, or whether 
they are also read by religious communities, consisting of 
ordinary people (who then take an active role in interpreting 
and responding to the holy texts during textual rituals). Here 
the homo ludens becomes a homo legens, and vice versa. There is 
no one thing without the other.18
Thus, it seems that continuities (not only breakthroughs) exist 
between the far religious past and the more general aspects of 
the axial age, and they do so by virtue of the external memory 
device of scriptures. Scriptural cultures, as emphasised by 
Merlin Donald, are not solely dependent on the ‘engrams’ of 
individual brains (as ECTR has it) but are stabilised as 
‘exograms’, in cultural niche construction beyond the 
thoughts and experiences of individual, solitary minds.
If this is the case, note that there may be less of a common 
individualising move in the four axial traditions than is often 
suggested. When Jeremiah called for the Law to be written into 
the hearts of blood and flesh (Jer 31:33), this implied an 
interiorisation of the divine Law. But was a similar move 
present in Hinduism and Buddhism? The Buddha denied the 
reality of the individual soul as an illusion to be cast away. The 
Upanishads (perhaps here closer to Plato’s correspondence 
between the soul and the world of ideas) refers to a long list of 
correspondences between the eye and the sun, the feet and the 
earth, the wind and the nostrils, and so on, which in the end 
are destined to be identical. The point here is that the core of 
the individual, the Atman, is identical with the Brahman, 
divinity itself. In brief, it is hard to find precursors for early 
modern ideas of individuality in the axial religions, especially 
in Eastern religions.
17.This point is made by Line Søgaard Christensen (2015:15–35). 
18.I’m here taking up an expression from my Old Testament colleague at Aarhus 
University, Professor Hans J. Lundager Jensen.
The cases of Japan and sub-Saharan Africa
Shmuel Eisenstadt was himself aware of this fact. In his book, 
Japanese Civilization from 1996, he argued that a highly 
developed society such as Japan embraced most axial 
elements but remained fundamentally pre-axial regarding 
the divinity of the imperial system and the nationalistic 
values of a particular ‘Japaneseness’ (nihonjin). As we know 
from World War II, these archaic ideas had devastating 
consequences for the enemies of Japan, and in the end for 
Japan itself. Still today, Japanese politicians have difficulties 
to admit the brutality of their past (unlike, for example, a 
country like Germany).
The sociologist Ann Swidler (co-author with Bellah in their 
famous book Habits of the Heart) has made similar observations 
about the African situation, based primarily from her long-
term fieldwork in Malawi. Her point is that ‘Africans have 
embraced modernity with unparalleled enthusiasm’ (AAC 
223). In general, science and medicine are endorsed. Likewise 
there is according to Swidler a longing for ‘official knowledge’, 
as can be evidenced in credentials and diplomas (AAC 227). 
The longing for transcendence among most sub-Saharan 
Africans is one of the key markers of a post-axial mentality 
(AAC 237; cf. Du Toit 2010).
At the same time Swidler argues that ‘African social patterns 
and the cultural codes that govern them have proved 
extraordinarily resilient’ (AAC 235). In her view, important 
areas in African culture are not axialised. The first feature she 
mentions is syncretism, the fact that a spiritual universe is 
affirmed alongside affirmations of science and universalistic 
ideas of human rights. I would add that the same seems to 
apply to most societies in the Northern hemisphere too. 
Indeed, syncretism seems to be the rule rather than the 
exception, as rightly anticipated in ECTR and amply 
evidenced by empirical anthropological studies, also within 
Indian and North-European contexts (cf. Jørgensen 2008).19
The other point highlighted by Swidler is perhaps more 
widespread on the African continent than on the European 
continent. This concerns the fact that power structures of the 
client-serf type are part of tradition, and not often criticised 
openly and in principle. According to Swidler, ‘Rulers are not 
directly held responsible to universalised, transcendent 
moralities, and capacities for collective action are still very 
much dependent on powers of chiefs and other traditional 
figures’ (AAC 23).
I’m not able to judge on the generalisations that Swidler has 
raised. But in line with Bellah’s generous view of the 
copresence of archaic and axial mindsets in religion, I wish to 
question the presupposition that axialisation is a one-way 
street leading away from archaic to modern mind-sets. There 
may well be many depressing aspects of archaic mentality 
around us, both in Africa and in other parts of the world, but, 
19.On material based on Danish cancer-survivors, see Christine Tind Johannesen-
Henry, ‘Polydox eschatology: Relating systematic and veryday theology in a cancer 
context’, Studia Theologica 66(2), 107–129.
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equally, there will always be invigorating aspects of the 
interplay between axial and archaic aspects of culture too. In 
religion, rituals show a stronger resilience than theological 
schools of thought.
A concluding perspective: The 
sapiential discourse of Jesus
We may conclude, then, by asking as follows: exactly what is 
post-axial in our time? And what is post-axial about the 
teaching of Jesus? It seems to me that the foregrounding of 
‘theoretical cultures’ in Donald Merlin’s theory of axiality 
does not quite reach the level of axial universality that he is 
presupposing. We always live at deeper levels than we think. 
Nowhere do we find that theories are ruling the game of life, 
even though theories are important for channelling cultural 
preconceptions into a critical attitude. Indeed, we need to 
cast a critical eye towards tradition as much as to the 
alienating aspects of modernity, like the idea that human 
beings are solitary minds, living alone within their skulls 
with their thoughts. Here both biology and theology knows 
better.
The self-reflexivity of post-axial mentality should therefore 
not be limited to a theoretical attitude that looks at reality 
from a disengaged third-person perspective. Self-reflexivity 
may also be reached through a sapiential discourse, one 
which starts out from the middle of our involvements with 
shared experiences rather than attempting to take an elevated 
view from nowhere. Let me therefore end this paper with a 
reference to the sapiential forms of discourse that we find in 
the teachings of Jesus.
When Jesus wanted to exhort his followers to pray to God: 
‘knock, and the door will be opened for you’, he did so by 
inviting his disciples to think about the following:
Is there anyone among you who, if your child asks for a fish, will 
give a snake instead of a fish? Or if the child asks for an egg, will 
give a scorpion? If you then, who are evil, know how to give 
good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly 
Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him! (Lk 11:12–13)
Jesus is backing up his encouragement to pray to God 
unreservedly by invoking common sense knowledge about 
what fathers tend to do. Although the theme and target of 
this saying is the practice of prayer, the thought experiment 
itself is based on an analogy to ordinary fathers. From here 
the inductive move from the minor to the major starts out. 
Assuming that even self-absorbed human parents want to 
help their children, ‘how much more’ will not the heavenly 
Father listen to human prayers? This argumentative move 
only works if the listeners or readers already share an 
intuition about what it means to be a father, while also 
presupposing some analogy between human fathers and the 
divine father. In order to reach its argumentative target, the 
thought experiment of Jesus is thus based on a wider set of 
assumptions, not included in the thought experiment itself, 
such as the receptiveness of the God, whom Jesus addresses 
as ‘our heavenly Father’ in the Lord’s Prayer.
What is the kind of universality to which Jesus here appeals? 
Firstly, it is not something of a purely general nature. Gravity 
applies everywhere in the universe but caring fathers and 
mothers do not exist everywhere. That being so, wherever 
there is a father or mother who cares, something of universal 
significance emerges: the very phenomenon of caring itself. It 
is this phenomenon that serves as the common denominator 
between ordinary parents and God the Father. Moreover, 
who could imagine a human society, without mother and 
fathers caring for their children, sisters caring for their 
brothers, and vice versa, friends caring for one another? The 
question coming from the Jesus tradition to us today, is 
whether we can have a sustainable and flourishing society, 
without also caring for strangers – those who are perceived 
by Jesus and his followers as neighbours, that is, ‘proximates’?
From this perspective Jesus, the brother of men and women, 
does not only have an extended mind, as I argued above. He 
also appeals to the sense of deep sociality that is the wool and 
wharf of human societies. Seen from our contemporary 
evolutionary perspective, this sense of deep sociality has 
been nourished and cultivated by the deep evolutionary 
history of our forebears. It is very archaic. And yet it’s still 
with us today.
Deep incarnation is one way of articulating that the person of 
Jesus, and what he revealed about the human condition, can’t 
be historicised into being just a bygone member of the human 
race. In a similar way, no individual can be historicised to be 
just an individual taking care of him- or herself. Being human 
means experiencing the deep sociality of human existence. A 
person becomes a person through other persons. The point of 
Christology is that by conjoining this material world, the 
Father’s eternal Word or Wisdom entered into the matrix of 
material existence as well as into the social field of human 
communities.
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